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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TUMMURRU TRADES, I N C . , : 
P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f , i 
V . J 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION J 
Respondent/Defendant . : 
A p p e a l No . 8 9 - 0 2 0 9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT OF 
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT 
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) , 
effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not 
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax 
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
2. Sales or use tax is not due from Tummurru merely by an 
administrative determination by Tummurru that building materials 
owned by Tummurru and located within Utah will be used in the 
construction of out-of-state real property improvements or will be 
used by Tummurru in the construction of components to be used in 
the construction of out-of-state real property improvements. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104 (34) (1989) , 
effective July 1, 1989, by the Utah State Legislature does not 
require a holding that it has always been constitutional to tax 
material purchases used on the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
1 
The amendment of the statute described in Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), cited by Respondent/Defendant reflected 
a change in the law which the legislature could have enacted at any 
time, without any constitutional limitations. 
The change in the law in Madsen, supra, related to charges in 
the law relating to suits brought against state employees for 
actions taken in the course of their employment and did not involve 
constitutional limitations. 
The Commission is presumably arguing that the enactment of a 
statute by the legislature creating a rule of law which could have 
been or is not constitutional, creates, by legislative enactment, 
a presumption that the rule was constitutional prior to the 
enactment of the statute. 
Tummurru submits there is no authority for such an argument. 
To the contrary, whether a rule of law (i.e. in this case relating 
to sales of tangible personal property to persons within this state 
that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated 
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property 
located outside of this state) is or is not constitutional will be 
determined on its own merits. 
2. A sale subject to sales or use tax is not created by the 
determination by Tummurru that building materials located within 
Utah will be used in the construction of out-of-state real property 
improvements or will be used by Tummurru in the construction of 
components to be used in the construction of out-of-state real 
property improvements. 
Building materials purchased by Tummurru were not subject to 
sales or use tax at the time of purchase from a vendor under the 
2 
provis ions of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-12-103, exempting from sa les or use tax purchases for r e s a l e . 
In Levine v. S ta te Bd. of Equalization of the State of 
Cal i fornia , 299 P.2d 738, 743 (Cal. Dis t . Ct. App. 1956) the court 
out l ined the r a t i o n a l e for t h i s ru le as follows: 
"There are many situations which develop in the ordinary 
course of business where the purchaser is unable to determine at the 
time of the purchase Aether he will in fact resell the articles 
purchased or will use them. The resale certificate provisions of 
the law were enacted to permit the purchase to be tax free under 
these circumstances until such time as the ultimate disposition of 
the property is determined. If that disposition is a resale, in the 
form of tangible personal property, then no tax is due with respect 
to the original sale. If that disposition is for a use other than 
retention, demonstration, or display, while holding i t for sale in 
the regular course of business, then a tax is due because the 
property was not purchased for resale. . . . " 
The Commission presumably argues in i t s Brief (p.19) tha t an 
adminis t ra t ive determination by Tummurru tha t i t would use building 
mater ia l s purchased in Utah, then on hand and then located in Utah, 
cons t i t u t e s a s a l e , u t i l i z a t i o n or conversion of the building 
mater ia ls t o or with i t s e l f thus obl igat ing Tummurru to pay sa les 
tax a t the time of such adminis t ra t ive determination. 
The Commission a lso presumably argues t ha t such an 
adminis t ra t ive determination, as a matter of law, i s a " t i t l e 1 1 
t r ans fe r within Utah ( i . e . in P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f ' s br ief , "The 
sa le between Tummurru, as a Utah wholesaler, and Tummurru, as a 
general con t rac tor , with t i t l e t r ans fe r r ing in Utah). 
Tummurru suggests t h a t such an adminis t ra t ive determination 
by Tummurru does not r e s u l t in the ul t imate use or conversion of 
the bui lding mater ia l s and i s not a sa l e , exchange or other 
d i spos i t ion of the property and t ha t no sa le , exchange or other 
d i spos i t ion of the property occurs u n t i l the (1) t r ans fe r of t i t l e 
3 
a n d / o r p h y s i c a l p o s s e s s i o n t o an o u t s i d e p u r c h a s e r , o r (2) a c t u a l 
p h y s i c a l u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e 
r e a l p r o p e r t y improvements. 
The f a c t s in Levine , sup ra , a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from 
t h o s e in t h e i n s t a n t ca se as fo l lows : 
a. In Levine, supra, the actual physical assembly of the 
property occurred within the s ta te . In t h i s case, the actual 
physical assembly occurred without the s ta te . 
b . In Levine, supra, the property was always tangible 
personal property and never became real property, unless, for 
example, by a specific contract between the purchaser-lessee and a 
lessor. In th i s case, in a l l instances the property did ultimately 
became real property and became real property without the s ta te of 
Utah. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
For a l l of t h e foregoing r e a s o n s , and for t h o s e s e t f o r t h in 
t h e Br ie f fo r t h e P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f , t h e P e t i t i o n e r / P l a i n t i f f , 
Tummurru T rades , I n c . , r e s p e c t f u l l y submits t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e 
Utah S t a t e Tax Commission should be r e v e r s e d . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s 11th day of May, 1990. 
By. 
j . jAy eui/nocK, ESQ, 
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER 
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It is argued that the trial court commit-
ted error and was guilty of misconduct in 
that he told the jury that the overt acts 
were "good overt acts". However, exami-
nation of the court's instruction in this 
connection shows that the court did not 
instruct the jury that the overt acts were 
good overt acts but stated that overt acts 
proven were "good overt acts". 
[22] Other complaints of appellant as 
to the instructions given are likewise with-
out merit. It further appears that many of 
the instructions offered by appellant were 
covered by other instructions or did not 
accurately state the law and no prejudicial 
error resulted from the refusal to give 
them. 
[23] Finally, appellant contends that 
the court erred by invading the province of 
the jury during its deliberations. No error 
appears in this connection. The jury dur-
ing its deliberations returned to court for 
further instructions and at the request of 
a juror, the court reread a portion of the 
instructions given relative to the question 
of the liability of persons charged with a 
conspiracy for the acts and declarations 
of persons not members of such conspiracy. 
The court then informed the jury that a 
person who committed a criminal act with-
out having knowledge of a conspiracy 
would not be guilty thereof. It appears 
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed 
on the law applicable to the charges set 
forth in the indictment and that the court 
did not invade the province of the jury 
during its deliberations. 
In view of what we have heretofore said, 
we deem it unnecessary to pass on other 
points raised by appellant. ' 
The judgment and order denying motion 
for new trial are affirmed. 
BARNARD, P. J., and GRIFFIN, J., 
concur. 
Hyman LEVINE tnd Emma Levinc, limited 
partners, Isidore Levine, Sidney Rose and 
Sid B. Levfne, general partners, dofng busi-
ness under the firm names of Santa Ft 
Tank & Tower Company, Division of In-
dustrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and Acme 
Tank Manufacturing Company, Division of 
Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a limited 
partnership, and Manny A. Rose, Plain-
tiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STA -£ BOARD CF" EQL Al t2AT!;7:N - - T -
State r-f California, DeferCort >rt 
Respondent. 
Hyman LEVINE and E~r^ Lev-'r.e i-r'"ec 
partners, Isidore Levine, Freda Levine, Sid-
ney Rose and Sid B. Levine, general part-
ners, doing business under the firm names 
of Santa Fe Tank & Tower Company, Divi-
sion of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., and 
Acme Tank Manufacturing Company, Divi-
sion of Industrial Manufacturers, Ltd., a 
limited partnership, and Manny A. Rose, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION of the 
State of California, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Civ. 21314, 21315. 
District Court of Appeal. Second District, 
Division 1. California. 
July 3, 105C. 
Rehearing Denied July 30, 1956. 
Hearing Denied An?. 30, 205G. 
Two actions for recovery of taxes lev-
ied and collected under Sales and Use Tax 
Law. The cases were consolidated for trial 
in the Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 
Ellsworth Meyer, J„ and judgment in each 
case went for the defendant State Board 
of Equalization. Appeals were taken from 
the judgments and the District Court of 
Appeal, Fonrt, J., held that where pur-
chasers of materials entered into construc-
tion contracts to fabricate and erect struc-
tures on real property out of state, the} 
were essentially performing services and 
were consumers of the materials which 
they had purchased and were not engaged 
in the reselling of materials as personal 
property. 
Affirmed. 
LEVINX v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION Cal. 7 3 9 
Citeas 299 P.2d 738 
1. Licenses C=>I5.I(6) 
Under Sales and Use Tax Law as in 
effect before 1953 amendments, materials 
purchased by California seller under cer-
tificates of resale and subsequently fab-
ricated, shipped and erected on out-of-state 
job sites pursuant to contracts with out-of-
state purchasers were subject to the tax. 
West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1, 
o051, 6091-6094, 6201 
2. Commerce C=64 
Licenses C=>15.I(6) 
Where materials were purchased by 
California seller under certificates of re-
sale and subsequently fabricated, shipped 
and erected on out-of-state job sites pur-
suant to contract with om-of-state pur-
chasers, such sales to California seller were 
not exempt from sales and use taxes by vir-
tue of statute relating to property exempted 
by Constitution or federal law, nor was state 
deprived of jurisdiction to collect tax by 
virtue of Interstate Commerce Clause of 
federal Constitution. West's Ann.Rev. & 
Tax.Code, § 6352; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, 
§ 8, cl. 3. 
3. Licenses C==>I5-I(3) 
Partners engaged in business of con-
structing tanks and other items which were 
fabricated pursuant to contracts and erected 
on real property outside the state were, 
under facts as shown by the record, ''con-
tractors" within meaning of law of Cali-
fornia, and were "consumers" for sales and 
use tax purposes. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax. 
Code, §§ 6909.1, 6051. 6091-6094. 
See publication Words and Phrases, 
for other judicial constructions and defi-
nitions of "Consumers*" and "Contrac-
tors". 
4. Estoppel C=>92(f) 
Where contractors in business of fab-
ricating items avoided immediate payment 
«»f sales taxes on purchases of materials by 
giving resale certificates as provided by 
statute, they had no standing to attempt 
in court to avoid conditions specified in 
such statute, by reference to other statutes 
and 
Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 6009.1, 6051, 
6091-6094. 
5. Licenses C=>32(l) 
Resale certificate provisions of Sales 
and Use Tax Law were enacted to permit 
purchase to be tax free, where purchaser 
is unable to determine at time of purchase 
whether he will in fact resell articles pur-
chased or will use them, until such time as 
ultimate disposition of property is deter-
mined. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 
6091-6094. 
6. Commerce 0=>64 
Licenses C=l5.t(6) 
Subjection to imposition of taxes un-
der Sales and Use Tax Law of purchases of 
materials, purchased by contractors who 
gave resale certificates and then subse-
quently fabricated items which they install-
ed on out-of-state job sites, did not conflict 
with Interstate Commerce Clause of federal 
Constitution, nor was extraterritorial effect 
thereby given to the Sales and Use Tax 
Law. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §§ 
6009.1, 6051,6091-6094; U.S.C.A.Const. art. 
1, § 8, cl. 3. 
7. Licenses C=>28 
Purpose of resale provisions of Sales 
and Use Tax Law is to relieve original 
seller from payment of sales tax where 
property is bought by purchaser for purpose 
of reselling it in form of tangible personal 
property. West's Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, 
§§ 6091-6095. 
8. Licenses C=>!5.l(8) 
Legislature did not intend to permit 
purchasers to escape entirely, payment of 
tax under Sales and Use Tax Law bv giv-
ing of resale certificate if it later devel-
oped that property was consumed or us<j'l 
rather than resold in form oi tangible per-
sonal property, and. to prevent this pessibi'-
Le-i :iturc enacted sectiun relating t< 
the use of article bought for resale. Wcs 
Ann.Rev. & Tax.Code, §5 6091-6095. 
Wadsworth & Fraser, by E. L. Fraser, 
by charges of inconsistency. West's Los Angeles, for appellants. 
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Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., James E. 
Sabine, Asst. Atty. Gen.. Edward Sumner, 
Dan Kaufmann, and James C. Maupin, 
Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent. 
FOURT, Justice. 
Appellants brought two actions for the 
recovery of taxes levied and collected un-
der the California Sales and Use Tax Law. 
The cases were consolidated for trial and 
judgment in each case went for the defend-
ant. 
One action, Case Number 21314, is for 
the recovery of taxes in the amount of 5°.-
717.17, with interest levied during the peri-
od from February 1, 1949, to September 30, 
1951. The second action, Case Number 
21315, is for the recovery of taxes in the 
sum of $1,940.18, with interest levied dur-
ing the period from July 1, 1948, to January 
31, 1949. Except for the taxable periods, 
the legal and factual issues in each action 
are substantially the same. 
The appellants were engaged in design-
ing, engineering, fabricating, selling and 
installing writer cooling towers, aerial tow-
ers and industrial wooden products es-
pecially designed for industrial processing. 
The business headquarters were located in 
Los Angeles, and their principal fabricating 
plant, storage and lumber yard were lo-
cated at Santa Rosa, California. Cus-
tomers' purchase orders were first Sent to 
the Los Angeles office where design and 
engineering work was performed. The or-
ders were then forwarded to Sania Rosa, 
accompanied by requisitions to inventory. 
Fabrication and loading for shipment were 
I. Revenue and Taxation Code seer;,,n?: 
*'£ U00f».l. What nor included in #>t<>r-
njrc" or 'use.' 'Storage" and 'us*-' do n<>t 
include the Unpins, retaining or C : ; T -
eisin^ av.y rijrht or power over tangible 
personal property shipped or brought 
into tlii< State fur the purp«'>e of subse-
quently transporting it outride the St..t.» 
for use thereafter a^bly or.tsid* the 
State, or for the purpose of bein:: pro-
cessed, fabricated, or niaii"ifa'#ujr.-d in-
to, attn'-hed to or incorporated into, other 
tangible personal propi-rty to be trans-
ported outside tbe State and thereafter 
used solely outside the State." 
performed at Santa Rosa. The items fab-
ricated were either (1) sold and mereh- di -
livered to the job sites specified by cus-
tomers, or (2) erected on the customers' job 
sites by appellants. Out-of-state shipments 
were made by railroad car with appellants 
as consignee at the out-of-state job site. 
Appellants* erection superintendent took 
possession of the shipment upon arrival 
and with the assistance of local labor super-
vised the erection work. No deficiency tax 
assessments were made upon out-of-state 
sales not involving erection. The busines> 
was a specialty in that the items fabri-
cated consisted almost entirely of item-
specifically engineered for a particular cus-
tomer. 
The instant appeals involve tax and in-
terest measured by the price paid by appel-
lants for materials which were purchased 
in California, ex tax under resale certifi-
cates. The raw materials were first placed 
in inventory in California and, as orders 
were received for the erection of one of 
the completed structures to be manufactured 
and installed by appellants, after the de-
sign and engineering work was done, the 
necessary raw materials were withdrawn 
from inventory as required, and fabricated 
in California for subsequent erection and 
installation by the appellants outside Cali-
fornia on customers' job sites. The pur-
chase, storage and fabrication of the ma-
terials all took place in this state. 
We are concerned with the provisions e>f 
the law as it existed during the taxable pe-
riods.1 
•'§ 00.11. Imposition v.uCi rate of t::x. 
T<'\ tht* privilege of se'i:a.: tar^iiilf p<r-
s«•!:;»! property at retail a tax i* hej-.-bv 
iiapus'Mi up'T. all retailer? o: the r:\\»- of 
1M-J percent of the jrruss re«-*-ip!«; «•:' 
any retailer from the sale i»f all tan^ib ••' 
personal property sold at retail in ta> 
State on or after August 1. lO.'t^. nt:d to 
and ineludin^ June .'50. M»-T>. and at the 
rate of o percent thereafter, and at the 
rat" of 2\2 percent on and after .Inly 
1. VA4", and to and inehr::r.£ June .*;<>. 
VMU, and at tbe rate of V> percent there-
after." 
LEVINE • . STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION Cal. 741 
Cite as 299P.:dT3? 
In 1953, section 6000.1 was amended by chaser may elect to include in his gress re-
strikinc therefrom the word* "shipped or ceipts the amount of the rental charged 
brought into this State". In the same year, rather than the cost sales price of the 
section 6094 was amended as follows: property to him/' (Italics indicating addi-
"§ 60:M. If a purchaser who gives a tions made to the section.) 
certificate makes any use of the property Where the purchaser gave a valid rc-
other than retention, demonstration, or dis- sale certificate pursuant to sections 6091-
play while holding it for sale in the reg- 6093, and the gross receipts involved were 
tilar course of business, the use shall be accordingly not included in the measure of 
deemed a retail sale by tc.rable to the pur- the sales tax imposed upon the vendor, any 
chaser under Chapter 3 of this part as of use by the purchaser other than mere re -
thc time the property is first used by him, tention, demonstration or display while 
and the cost sales price of the property to holding the property for sale in the regular 
him shall be deemed the gross receipts from course of business was under section 6094 as 
such retail sale the measure of the tax. it read during the period involved herein, 
Only n-hen there is an unsatisfied use tax and prior to the section's amendment in 
liability on tiiis basis shall the seller be 1953, deemed a retail sale by the purchaser 
liable for sales tax with respect to the sale and subject to the sales tax measured by 
of the property to the purchaser. If the the purchaser's cost. The amendment of 
sole use of the property other than reten- 1953 provided that the use of tangible per-
tion, demonstration, or display in the reg- sonal property, other than retention, dem-
ular course of business is the rental of the onstration or display, for sale in the reg-
property while holding it for sale, the pur- ular course of business by the one who pur-
"§ C091. Presumption that gross re-
ceipts subject to tax: Burden of proof. 
For the purpose of the proper adminis-
tration of this part and to prevent eva-
sion of the sales tax it shall be presumed 
that all gross receipts are subject to the 
tax until the contrary is established. 
The burden of proving that a sale of 
tangible personal property is not a sale 
at retail is upon the person who makes 
the sale unless he take* from the pur-
chaser a certificate to the effect that the 
property is purchased for resale." 
••£ f.092. Purchaser's certificate that 
purchase for resale: Sufficiency to re-
lieve seller of burden of proof. T1K cer-
tificate relieves the seller from the burdeD 
of proof only if taken in good faith from 
a person who is engaged in the business 
of selling tangible personal property and 
who holds the permit provided for in 
Article 2 of this chapter and who, at 
the time of purchasing the tangible p- r-
ponal property, intends to s«-11 it in the 
regular course of business or is unahh- ro 
ascertain at the time of purchase wlo-th^r 
the property will be sold or will be used 
for sonic other purpose." 
'*$ (Mi9.*>. Same: Execution, form, and 
contents. The certificate *diall be signed 
by and bear the name and address of the 
purchaser, shall indicate the number of 
the permit issued to the purchaser, and 
shall indicate the general character of 
the tangible personal property sold by the 
purchaser in the regular course of busi-
ness. The certificate shall be substan-
tially in such form as the board may pre-
scribe." 
"§ 0094. Effect of using article bought 
for resale. If a purchaser who gives a 
certificate makes any use of the property 
other than retention, demonstration, or 
display while holding it for sale in th* 
regular course of business, the use shall 
be deemed a retail sale by the purchaser 
as of the time the property is first used 
by him. and the cost of the property to 
him shall be de«-med the gros^ reeripts 
from such retail sale. If the sob use 
of the property other than retention, 
demonstration, or display in the regular 
course of business is the rental of the 
property while holding it for sale, the 
purchaser may elect to include iD hi«= 
gross receipts the amount of th* rental 
charged rather than the cost of the prop-
erty t" him." 
"$ <>203. Imposition and rate of tax. 
An excis< tax is hereby imposed on the 
storage, use. or other consumption m this 
State of tangible personal property pur-
chase! from arv retailer on or after July 
1, 29:;.", for storage, use. or other con-
sumption in this State at the rate of 3 per-
cent of the sales price of the pr*.p'-rry, 
and at the rate of 21** percent or. and 
after July 3. 3943. and to and including 
June 30, 1949. and at the rate of 3 per-
cent thereafter.'' 
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chased the property under a valid retail 
certificate is subject to the use tax imposed 
by section 6201, rather than the sales tax 
imposed by section 6051. 
During the times with which we are con-
cerned, section 1921 of the California Ad-
ministrative Code, relating to the Board of 
Equalization—Sales and Use Tax (being 
formerly known as Board of Equaliza-
tion Sales and Use Tax Ruling No. 11), pro-
vided in substance as is set forth in the foot-
note hereto.2 
[1] Appellants' contention, in substance, 
is that prior to the 1953 amendment, the 
Sales and Use Tax Law was ambiguous 
with respect to the taxation of materials 
purchased by a California seller under cer-
tificates of resale and subsequently fabri-
cated, shipped and erected on out-of-state 
job sites pursuant to contract with out-of-
state purchasers, and that the 1953 amend-
ments to sections 6009.1 and 6094 should be 
construed as declaration of existing law. 
Before the 1953 amendment, section 
6009.1 exempted from the definition of tax-
able storage and use. under certain cir-
cumstances, only the use of tangible per-
sonal property "shipped or brought into this 
State for the purpose of subsequently trans-
porting it outside the Stale for use there-
after solely outside the State, * * *." 
In the case of People v. Grazer, 13S Cal. 
App.2d 274, 291 P.2d 957. 960, the court 
said: 
2. The term "Contractor" as used in this 
administrative ruling is defined as includ-
ing both general contractors and subcon-
tractors and including also contractors 
engaged in such building trades as car-
pentry, bricklaying, cement work, steel 
work, plastering, sheet metal work, roof-
ing, tile and terrazzo work, electrical 
work, plumbing, heating, air '-<>n<iuioimi£, 
painting and interior decorating. 
The term "Construction Contracts" is 
defined as a contract for erecting a build-
ing or other structures on land and in-
cludes lump-sum. cost-plus and time-and-
inatcrial contracts. 
The term ''Materials" is defined as 
tangible personal property which, when 
combined with other tangible personal 
property loses its identity to become an 
"Respondent argues that it has never been 
the intent or effect of the code provisions 
to tax the transactions here involved and 
refers us to the declaration to that effect 
by the legislature when it passed the ex-
clusionary section 6019. If the existing 
law taxed these transactions, and we hold 
that it did, then the legislature could not 
change the law by declaring that it had 
never intended to tax them. 
" T h e usual purpose of a special interpre-
tative statute is to correct a judicial inter-
pretation of a prior law which the Legis-
lature determines to be inaccurate. Where 
such statutes are given any effect, the effect 
is prospective only. This seems correct, for 
any other result would make the Legislature 
a court of last resort.' (2 Sutherland Stat-
utory Construction, third edition, sec. 3004.) 
"In any event the legislature could not 
retroactively change what had been the 
law by declaring what a preceding legis-
lature had meant by what it had said." See, 
also, Stockton Savings & Loan Bank v. 
Massanet, IS Cal.2d 200, 114 P.2d 592; 
Board of Social Welfare v. County of L. A., 
27 Cal .2d 90, 162 P.2d 635; California Em-
ployment Stabilization Comm. v. Payne, 31 
Cal.2d 210. 1ST P.2d 702. 
[21 The appellant further contends that 
the imposition of the tax violates the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution. The initial sales and purchases of 
the materials by the appellants were sub-
ject to a sales tax in that the property was 
integral and inseparable part of the com-
pleted structure. The ruling contains a 
list of ' 'materials" such as flooring, in-
sulation, laths, lumber, oil. paint, piping, 
valves, pipelinings, putty, rooncg, sheet 
metal, steel, vallboard, weath* rstripping. 
wood preserver, etc. 
The term "Fixtures" is defined as items 
accessory to a building and which do not 
lose their identity as accessaries when 
plarfd «»r insr.-illed. such as lighting fix-
tures, off. 
The ruling specifically provides in sub-
division (b) (1) that "Contractors are 
the <i»i:<!;i.jer> of materials used by them 
in fulfilling construction contracts and 
the tax applies to the sale of such ma-
terials to the contractors." 
LEVTNE v. STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION Cal 7 4 3 
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delivered to appellants at a point in the the purchase to be tax free under these 
state. Such sales were not exempt under circumstances unti] such time as the ulti-
section 6352 of the Revenue and Taxation mate disposition of the property is deter-
Code, nor was the state deprived of juris- mined. If that disposition is a resale, in 
diction to collect the tax by virtue of the the form of tangible personal property, 
Interstate Commerce Clause of the Federal then no tax is due with respect to the orig-
Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. inal sale. If that disposition is for a use 
[3] The appellants were engaged in the 
business of constructing tank? and the items 
heretofore mentioned, which were fabri-
cated pursuant to contracts to be erected 
on real property outside of the state. In 
our opinion they were, under the facts of 
these particular cases, contractors within 
the meaning of the law of this state, and 
were consumers. It was said in General 
Electric Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
111 CaLApp.2d ISO, 187, 244 P.2d 427, 431: 
" * * * Where the materials are com-
bined with other materials so as to lose 
their identity and become part of the com-
pleted structure the contractor is deemed 
to be the consumer of such materials 
* * * » 
[4] But for the giving of resale cer-
tificates, the sales tax would have applied at 
the rime of the sale of the raw materials to 
the appellants. By giving the resale certi-
ficates appellants escaped reimbursing their 
sellers for the sales tax at the time of the 
initial purchases and sales. Such certifi-
cates relieved the seller of tru obligation 
initially to pay the sale? tax and 
was no necessity for the sellers 
sales tax reimbursement from the 
as buvcrs. Having elected to 
co: ditjons of Artie \ Chaptc 
thus there 
to collect 
appellants 
accept the 
2. Division 
2 of the Revenue and Taxatioi 
tior.s 6091—6095, relative to resale ce 
cates, the appellants are in no positi 
attempt to avoid the conditio 
tide by reference to other 
the Code and bv charges o: 
e oje-, sec-
•rtin-
i to 
*i "Ar-
ms in 
tencv. 
oi t? 
rov-si 
[51 There are many situations which 
develop in the ordinary course of business 
where the purchaser is unable to determine 
at the time of the purcha.-c whether he 
will in fact resell the articles purchased' or 
will use them. The resale cer pro-
visions of the law were enacted to permit 
other than retention, demonstration, or dis-
play, while holding it for sale in the regular 
course of business, then a tax is due be-
cause the property was not purchased for 
resale. However, under these circumstanc-
es, the person who gave the resale certifi-
cate is required to pay a tax at the rate of 
the sales tax, but measured by the cost of 
the property to him. The legislature appar-
ently felt that it was fair to impose a tax 
on the purchaser under these conditions 
because the seller could have collected re-
imbursement for the tax from the buyer, 
except for his reliance upon the resale cer-
tificate. 
[6] The appellants, in the instant cases, 
both stored and fabricated the materials in 
California, pursuant to construction con-
tracts; they were not merely retaining 
these materials, demonstrating them or dis-
playing them while holding them for 
sale in the regular course of business. 
Furthermore, since all of these events took 
place in California and were preliminary 
to the actual shipment of the structures, 
there can be, in our opinion, no application 
of the Interstate Commerce Clause of the 
Federal Constitution. Southern Pacific Co. 
v. Gallagher. 30b U.S. 267, 59 S.Ct. 38°. 
S3 L.Ed. ?S6; Utah Power & Light Co. 
v. Pfost. 286 U.S. 165, '-2 S.Ct. 548, 76 L. 
Ed. 103S; American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 
250 U.S. 45!'. ?l> S.Ct. '-22, 63 L.Ed. 1084. 
In other words, the appellants cannot use 
the resale certificate sections to strip the 
state of its jurisdiction merely because the 
ultimate and final use of the property took 
place in another state as part of the con-
tinuing process of contracting. 
Appellant? further contend that extrater-
ritorial effect is being given to the Califor-
nia Sales and Use Tax Lav. in these cases 
in that the contracting work was per-
formed outside of the state of California. 
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The actual erection of the structures was 
only a portion of the contracting agree-
ment The agreement to erect the struc-
tures establishes the nature of the activi-
tics of the appellants as a contractor. How-
ever, all of the incidents with "which the 
infant cases are concerned, insofar as they 
involve the applicability of the California 
Saks and Use Tax Law, are incidents 
which occurred in California. The prop-
erty was bought and delivered in California 
and a sales tax would have been paid but 
for the giving of the resale certificates; 
it was stored in California, it was deter-
mined that it would be dedicated to the per-
formance of a construction contract and it 
was removed from storage in California, 
then fabricated in California, that fabrica-
tion consisting of the rendering of con-
tracting services transforming the raw ma-
terials into the completed strucfures prior 
to their being shipped outride of the state 
for erection pursuant to the construction 
agreements 
[7,8] Article 3, Chapter 2, Division 2 
of the Revenue and Taxation Code relates 
entirely to resale certificates The pu^po-e 
of the provisions of sections 6091-6 *95 is to 
relieve the original seller from the payment 
of sales tax where the property is bought 
by the purchaser for the purpose of re-
belling it in the fe.rm of tangible personal 
property ObwoL^ly, the leg'slature did 
not intend to permit part es in this type of 
transaction to escape payment of a ta-\ 
entirely b> the grwng of a resale certificate 
if it later developed that the property was 
consumed or used rather than resold in the 
form of tang'ble persona1 prot>erty To 
prevent thfu poccib*litvr the lesr^a'ure en-
acted section 609-* Once it is established 
that the property is not to be resold in the 
form of tangible personal property then the 
tax is due and payable since the salts tax 
was not paid at the time of the original 
sale. The legislature has required that the 
purchaser must now pay the tax, but has 
related the tax back to the initial purchase 
to the extent that that purchase price is 
controlling as to the measure of the tax 
There is nothing in sections 6091-6095 to 
indicate that the legislature intended in am 
way to relate these particular provision* 
of law to problems dealing with interstate 
commerce. 
The appellants further argue that be-
cause the Board did not tax the sale of ma-
terials by the appellants in knocked-down 
form to be delivered without erection at the 
out-of-state job sites, that the Board was 
inconsistent in taxing the materials fabri-
cated into structures in California pursu-
ant to a construction contract calling for 
erection of the structures in other states 
They further argue that in all cases thev 
were merely selling pergonal property and 
should come within the Board's rule that 
jrross receipts from sales to manufacturer*, 
producers or processors of tangible personal 
property which becomes an ingredient or 
component part of the tangi* le pergonal 
property which they manufacture, produce 
or process are not taxable Where the 
appellants had no construction contract bur 
were merely selling their materials to pur-
chasers ou*-of-state. they were reselling 
personal property But where they entered 
into a construction eortract to fabr,ca#e 
and erect struct res on real property, they 
were essentially performing services As 
to the construction contracts they we re 
the consumers of the materials which t v e\ 
had purchased They were not reselling 
these materials as personal property, but 
were rather using them m the process of 
fulfilling a construction contract, and thu* 
fall within the provisions of Board rule Nu 
11. 
Judgment afr-med 
WHITE, P J , and DOR \X , J , concur 
Hearing denied. SCH \ L E R and M. 
COMB, JJM dissenting 
MADSEN v. 
ate M 769 T26 
Richard D. MADSEN and Nancj Madsen, 
Boyd A. S*en»en and Beatrice S* en-
gen, Blaine Anderson and Sheree 
Anderson, Hope A Hilton, Cvnthia Hil-
ton, Ralph M Hilton, Gene Helland and 
the Middle East Foundation, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
Minin D. BORTHICK, W. Smoot Brim-
hall, and John Does I to V, being for-
mer Commissioners of the Utah De-
partment of Financial Institutions, De-
fendants and Appellees. 
No. 19704. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Dec 12, 1988 
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1989 
Investors brought suit against former 
Commissioners of Department of Financial 
Institutions individually claiming their 
gross negligence resulted m loss of their 
investment The Third District Court Salt 
Lake Count}, David B Dee J dismissed 
on grounds of res judicata sovereign lm 
mumtv and statute of limitations On ap-
peal the Supreme Court Zimmerman J 
held that (1) res judicata was not apphca 
ble (2) Government Immunitv Act dia rot 
applv and (3) suit was not time ban*ed due 
to extension of statute of limitations b> 
dismissal of pnor suit 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Judgment <§=>540 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action 
onlv if suit in w hich that cause of action is 
being asserted and pnor suit satisfv tnree 
requirements both cases mv oh e same par 
ties or their pnvies, claim which is alleg 
edly barred must have been presented m 
first suit or must be one that could have 
and should have been raised there and 
first suit must have resulted m final judg 
ment on the ments 
BORTHICK Utah 245 
243 (Ttafa IMS) 
2. Judgment «=>570(4) 
Since trial court, m dismissing earlier 
action between investors and State Depart-
ment of Finance Commissioners officially, 
could not legitimately pass on ments of the 
complaint, because plaintiffs had failed to 
satisf) statutory notice requirements which 
were a precondition to suit, claim preclu-
sion did not prevent plaintiffs later suit 
against Commissioners individually Rules 
Civ Proc, Rule 41(b) 
3. Pretrial Procedure £=>554 
Dismissal of suit for "lack of jurisdic-
tion" for failure to compl) writh rules of 
civil procedure and court orders includes a 
dismissal for failure to meet a precondition 
to suit Rules Civ Proc, Rule 41(b) 
4. Pretrial Procedure @=>554 
Plaintiffs failure to meet notice re-
quirements under Government Immunity 
Act w as a failure to fulfill a precondition to 
suit, and thus dismissal of such action was 
for lack of junsdiction U C A 1953 63-
30-11 63-30-12 Rules Civ Proc Rule 
4Kb) 
5. Judgment <s=*634 
Under rules of issue preclusion adjudi 
cation of an issue bars its relitigation in 
another action if issue in both cases was 
identical judgment was final with respect 
to that issue issue was full) fairlv and 
competent!) litigated m first action and 
pam who is precluded from litigating the 
issue was either a part) to the first action 
or a pnv) of part) 
6 Judgment c=702 
Since unaer law applicable in 1980, 
State did not have a dutv to mdemnifv 
Commissioners of Department of Financial 
Institutions m suit brought agams: them 
for activities ansmg out of their duties but 
onlv had dutv to defend them plaintiffs 
were not required to ule notice of claim 
agamst officer with State pnor to bring-
ing suit agamst Commissioners mdniduallv 
under the Act thus' pnor dismissal of suit 
against Department and Commissioners of-
ficial!) did not have issue preclusive effect 
on later suit bv same plaintiffs agamst the 
Commissioners mdividuallv U C A 1953, 
63-30-11, 63-30-12 UCA1953 63-48-2 
w 
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to 63-4&-4, S ^ f r - ^ , 3), 63-48-8(1-4) (Re 
pealed). 
7. Statutes *=»212.5 
Amendment to a statute is presumed 
to have intended to change existing legal 
rights. 
8. Statutes $=>206 
In interpreting statutes, Supreme 
Court had fundamental duty to give effect, 
if possible, to every word of the statute. 
9. Officers and Public Employees $=>116 
Later amendment of Government Im-
munity Act, granting officials immunity 
even for gross negligence which arose in 
course of their duties was substantive 
change of law and did not retroactively 
apply and bar citizens' suit for officials' 
actions which predated amendment. U.C. 
A.1953, 63-30-1 et seq. 
10. Limitation of Actions <£=*130(5) 
Upon date of affirmation of dismissal 
of timely first action, statute of limitations 
was extended for one year in which to 
allow plaintiffs to file a second action. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-12-26(4), 78-12-28(1), 78-
12-29(2), 78-12-40. 
11. Limitation of Actions e=»118(2) 
For purposes of determining timeliness 
of suit, suit is considered filed by filing of a 
criminal complaint or service of summons, 
not by filing of a notice of claim, where 
that notice is a precondition to suit. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 3(a). 
Daniel F. Bertch, Robert J. Debry, Phillip 
B. Shell, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and 
appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Paul M. Warner, Ste-
phen J. Sorenson, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants and appellees. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Richard D. and Nancy Madsen, 
Boyd A. and Beatrice Swensen, Blaine and 
Sheree Anderson, Hope A., Cynthia, and 
Ralph M. Hilton, Gene Helland, and the 
Middle East Foundation, all investors in the 
1. For a more detailed account of the factual 
background of this case, see Madsen v. Borthick, 
now-defunct Grove Finance Company ("the 
investors"), brought suit against defen-
dants Mirvin D. Borthick and W. Smoot 
Brimhall, former commissioners of the 
Utah Department of Financial Institutions 
("the Commissioners"). The investors seek 
to recover the amount of their lost invest-
ments from the Commissioners personally. 
The trial court granted a summary judg-
ment in favor of the Commissioners, basing 
its ruling on several alternative grounds. 
The court held that the doctrine of res 
judicata barred the action, that the Com-
missioners are immune from suit under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and 
that the applicable statute of limitations 
bars this action. The investors challenge 
all of these legal conclusions. We agree 
with the investors that the trial court's 
ruling was incorrect and reverse and re-
mand the matter for further proceedings. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 
(Utah 1983) [hereinafter Madsen / ] . the 
plaintiffs in the instant case sued the State, 
its Department of Financial Institutions, 
and its Commissioner of Financial Institu-
tions, Mirvin D. Borthick, in his official 
capacity, claiming that they had lost most 
of their investment in Grove Finance when 
it became insolvent and that its insolvency 
was due to the defendants' failure to per-
form their statutory duties.1 658 P.2d at 
627-28. The trial court dismissed that case 
for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted" because the inves-
tors, in suing the State and state officers in 
their official capacities, had failed to file 
the statutorily required notice of claim 
within the aliened time. Id at 628; see 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12 (Supp. 
1979). This Court upheld that dismissal. 
658 P.2d at 633. 
In our opinion in Madsen /, we indicated 
that one reason for affirming the trial 
court's dismissal was the investors' failure 
to sue Commissioner Borthick in his indi-
vidual capacity. See ia\ at 632-33. Absent 
an allegation that he had "acted or failed to 
act through gross negligence, fraud or mai-
653 P.2d 627, 628-29 (Utah 1983) [hereinafter 
Madsen / ) . 
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that this language should be ignored, that 
we should look instead to the 1983 amend-
ment of section 63-30-11, which deleted 
this language and had the effect of ex-
pressly requiring service of a notice of 
claim on the State in all suits against em-
ployees, whether or not any judgment 
might ultimately be payable by the State. 
They argue that the 1983 amendment was 
intended to clarify the earlier statute and 
to bring it into conformance with the legis-
lature's true intention in enacting the earli-
er version of the statute. 
[7,8] The Commissioners are correct in 
concluding that the effect of the 1983 dele-
tion of this language was to leave only the 
first paragraph of the section, which re-
quires that a notice of claim be filed with 
the State in all suits brought against state 
employees for actions taken in the course 
of their employment. We also agree that if 
the State has a statutory duty to defend 
employees in all such suits and if the 
State's duty to indemnify is defined as en-
compassing its dun* to defend employees, 
the statutory provisions relating to the no-
tice requirement and to indemnification are 
more coherent since the 1983 amendment 
was made. However, we need not consider 
whether the legislature can properly char-
acterize the duty to defend as a duty to 
indemnify, for we find no suggestion in 
sections 63-48-2 through -4 that it intend-
ed to do so. Those provisions clearly state 
that there is no duty to indemnify by pay-
ing a judgment awarded in an action for 
11. The Commissioners have made no persuasive 
argument for disregarding the presumption that 
an amendment is intended to change existing 
legal rights. See 1A N Singer, Sutherland on 
Statutory Construction § 22.30 (Sands 4th rev. 
cd. 19S5). Furthermore, in asking us to rule 
that an entire sentence of the statute had abso-
lutely no meaning ai ail. the> have ignored our 
fundamental dutv to give effect, if possible, to 
every word of the statute. See Totoncc v. 
Thomas, 16 Utah 2d 175 178, 397 P.2d 9S4, 9S7 
(1965); Stevenson \. Sal: Lake Cit\, 7 Utah 2d 
28, 31, 317 P.2d 597, 599 (1957); 2A X. Singer, 
Sutherland on Statute^. Construction § 46.06 
(Sands 4th rev. ed 1984). 
12. At the time this cause of action arose, section 
63-30-4 of the Code provided in pan as follows* 
The remedy against a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an act 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice—in oth-
er words, an action brought against an 
employee in an individual capacity. More-
over, the only possible import of the final 
sentence of the second paragraph of sec-
tion 63-30-11 is that there must be some 
suits brought under the Act against em-
ployees of which the State need not be 
notified. Unless we are to ignore that sen-
tence entirely, the 1980 version of section 
63-30-11 is more plainly read to expressly 
except from the notice of claim require-
ment suits against employees in their indi-
vidual capacities. If this were not enough 
to undermine the Commissioners' position, 
we find no indication in the 1983 amend-
ment or elsewhere that the amendment 
was intended to clarify a preexisting inten-
tion.11 For these reasons, we conclude that 
in 1980, section 63-30-11 did not require 
one suing state employees in their individu-
al capacities to file a notice of claim with 
the State. Therefore, the issue preclusion 
branch of the doctrine of res judicata can-
not support the summary judgment. 
[9] Having rejected res judicata as a 
basis for the summary judgment, we next 
consider the correctness of the trial court's 
ruling that the Commissioners are immune 
from suit under the Governmental Immuni-
ty Act. The investors point out that the 
Act, as it read at the time the cause of 
action arose in 1980, granted the Commis-
sioners no immunity from personal liability 
for gross negligence committed in their 
individual capacities.12 The Commission-
er omission which occurs during the perform-
ance of such employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of au-
thority is, after the effective date of this act, 
exclusive of any other civil action or proceed-
ing b> reason of the same subject matter 
against the employee or the estate of the em-
ployee whose act or omission gave rise to the 
claim, unless the employee acted or failed to 
act through gross negligence, fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a representa-
tive capacity if the act or omission com-
plained of is one for which the governmentaJ 
entity ma> be liable, but no employee shall be 
held personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employ-
ment or under color of authority, unless it is 
